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CODES OF CONDUCT FOR THE LIFE SCIENCES: 
SOME INSIGHTS FROM UK ACADEMIA 
 
 by Malcolm R. Dando and Brian Rappert1
 
 
Introduction 
 
1. The States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) will 
meet in the inter-Review Conference2 process in June and December 2005 to "discuss 
and promote common understanding and effective action" on: 
 
The content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. 
 
2.  There is little doubt in many sections of the community concerned with the 
strengthening of the regime totally prohibiting biological weapons that this is a 
necessary issue to consider in regard, for example, to the potential misuse of the 
results of benign developments in the life sciences.3 For example, the Fink Committee 
set up by the National Research Council to examine these issues in the United States  
identified seven classes of ‘Experiments of Concern’ which they considered required 
prior approval. These were experiments that: 
 
1. Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective; 
 
2. Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics and antiviral 
agents; 
 
3. Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a non-pathogen virulent; 
 
4. Would increase the transmissibility of a pathogen; 
 
5. Would alter the host range of a pathogen; 
 
6. Would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities; 
 
7. Would enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin 
 
The committee also noted that the list of experiments of concern was likely to 
increase as the advances in the life sciences continued in future years and suggested 
                                                 
1 Malcolm R. Dando is at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK and Brian 
Rappert is at the Department of Sociology at the University of Exeter, UK. This work was carried out 
under the UK Economic and Social Research Council grant number Res 223250053. 
2 United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 
their Destruction, Geneva, 19 November – 7 December 2001 and 11-222 November 2002, Final 
Document, BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002. Available at http://www.opbw.org  
3 See, for example, Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive 
Application of Biotechnology, Development, Security, and Cooperation, Biotechnology Research in an 
Age of Terrorism, The National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2004. Available at: 
http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10827.html 
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that a national board be set up to provide oversight of such developments.   Indeed, 
some medical researchers are already working with new ethical guidelines which state 
that:4
 
Biomedical research may generate knowledge with potential for both 
beneficial and harmful application.  Before participating in research, 
physician researchers should assess foreseeable ramifications of their 
research in an effort to balance the promise of benefit from biomedical 
innovation against potential harms from corrupt application of the findings. 
 
and: 
 
The potential harms associated with some research may warrant regulatory 
oversight.  Physician-researchers have a responsibility not only to adhere to 
standards for research, but also to lend their expertise to the development of 
safeguards and oversight mechanisms both nationally and internationally.  
Oversight mechanisms should balance the need to advance science with the 
risk of malevolent application. 
 
In addition, as pointed out in Bradford Briefing Paper No. 135, there are a variety of 
initiatives being undertaken at national and international levels by the life sciences 
community in relation to developing a variety of codes. 
 
3. This Briefing Paper, with the specific purpose of assisting the deliberations in 
Geneva by States Parties in 2005, considers what the views are amongst those 
engaged in carrying out practical work in the life sciences regarding the ‘dual use’ 
potential of their work, particularly in regard to the results and techniques generated 
through experimental work.  The Briefing Paper starts by setting out the methodology 
used to collect the views of those engaged in the life sciences and how the data was 
analysed.  Our overall objective was to develop a system in which the life scientists 
could become engaged in helping to prevent the misuse of their science.  As it became 
evident that there had been little prior consideration of many dual use issues by the 
life scientists who participated in this study, the approach adopted was to conduct 
seminars in which the authors sought to raise awareness about dual use problems and 
encourage discussion and deliberation, rather than seeking pre-established positions. 
However, through this process, it has also been possible to discover some of the 
current thinking of those involved.  Consequently, this Briefing Paper then goes on to 
present a view of the prevailing opinion amongst those engaged in the life sciences 
who participated in this study which made it clear that a divergence of views exists 
between those engaged in the life sciences and those in the community concerned 
with the strengthening of the regime totally prohibiting biological weapons. Finally, 
the implications of these findings for consideration of the content, promulgation, and 
adoption of codes of conduct for scientists are then set out.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Report of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, Guidelines to Prevent Malevolent Use of 
Biomedical Research. CEJA Report 9-A-04, 2004, American Medical Association.  
5 Brian Rappert, Towards a Life Sciences Code: Countering the threats from biological weapons, 
University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No. 13 (Second Series), 
September 2004. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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Methods 
 
4. The community of those engaged in the life sciences is quite diverse, encompassing 
scientists, technicians, medical practitioners, biotechnologists, information 
technologists, and engineers working in academia, human, industry, government civil 
agencies, biodefence, funding organisations and government in countries around the 
world.  It is therefore necessary to note that the study reported here is based on one 
segment of this community in one country.  We are grateful to the students and 
associated staff engaged in the life sciences in 25, predominantly UK, universities 
who, between October 2004 and May 2005, contributed to an interactive seminar run 
according to our design. 
 
5. This segment of the life sciences community was chosen in part for good practical 
reasons – one, universities are relatively open institutions that have a tradition of 
facilitating discussion about societal issues; two, we were able to fit our seminar 
within the regular weekly departmental seminar series held in most of these 
universities.  There were other important reasons for our choice of this segment of the 
life sciences community.  First and foremost, our seminar groups always included 
staff and postgraduates doing practical work in the life sciences – these were people 
'at the coalface' concerned with making real decisions about what work to do, how to 
publish it and how to obtain funding for further work.  Second, all our seminar 
participants used English as their working language and therefore had access to all the 
recent debates in the western media about possible bioterrorism and potential misuse 
of developments in the life sciences.  Third, as British university personnel are 
already subjected to a wide range of professional, institutional, and legal regulation,6 
they were already quite familiar with issues about the governance of science. 
 
6. Ascertaining the thinking of a group of people in a diverse community is not easy.  
In this case it was especially so for a number of reasons.  Initial interviews conducted 
by the authors in 2002-3 had indicated there was little awareness of dual-use issues 
among a subset of British life science academics.  In addition, we were concerned 
from the start that our questions might appear threatening to our audiences and 
therefore trigger defensive reactions.7  So, using an approach based on a questionnaire 
risked us asking questions that were not understood by, had different meanings for, or 
were dismissed by the people we were addressing.  One-to-one interviews would have 
allowed for more interaction between us and the scientists, but because of past 
interviews we were also keen to promote interaction between practicing life scientists. 
We therefore adopted a dialogue-orientated approach to achieve a greater mutual 
understanding of the issues at stake.  Therefore, a seminar was devised consisting of a 
series of PowerPoint slides with information and key questions to initiate discussion. 
It was designed so as to promote the active participation of attendees in discussions 
about questions such as: 
                                                 
6 Graham S. Pearson, A Code of Conduct for the Life Sciences: A practical approach,  Briefing Paper 
No. 15 (Second Series), University of Bradford, November 2004.  Available at : http://www.brad.ac.uk
/acad/sbtwc 
7 Argyris, C. (1993) Knowledge for Action: A guide to overcoming barriers to organisational change. 
Jossey-Bass Publishers, San Francisco. 
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  ‘What role can life scientists play in combating biological weapon threats?’; 
 
  ‘What are the social responsibilities of life scientists today?’; and 
 
   ‘Should experimental results always be published?’    
 
7.  The presentation was squarely focused on concerns about contentious ‘dual use’ 
experiments and possible oversight regimes, rather than on more traditional concerns 
about the control on materials and personnel in laboratories where biosecurity 
dovetails with matters of biosafety. The seminar was not simply a presentation with a 
question and answer period at the end.  Rather, it consisted of slides which outlined 
dual-use cases or policy initiatives to elicit discussion.  We were very careful to stress 
- in introducing each slide and its question(s) - that we were trying to find out what 
our participants thought about these issues.  We tried to allow discussion of each slide 
to continue until everyone who wanted to speak had had chance before moving on.  
Our audiences ranged from tens to a hundred, but were usually below forty, thus 
giving a chance for most who wished to do so to contribute. In our process of 
questioning, while we sought to remain neutral with regard to the questions asked, we 
also sought to challenge all participants regarding the data, assumptions, and 
inferences underlying their responses to the questions posed.  Our experience and 
subsequent feedback indicates that this approach enabled colleagues to question each 
other both during and after the seminars regarding concerns about the place of science 
in society.  We have received many positive comments from attendees regarding the 
novelty of the seminar’s interactive dimension and the considered dialogue it helped 
nurture. 
 
8. We began our work by running two pilot seminars at two universities in order to 
ensure the mechanics were in order and then we ran 23 further seminars in other 
universities (all except one in the UK).  After the pilot seminars we ran three sets of 
five seminars and one set of seven seminars in sequence. In total, 25 seminars were 
held as follows: 12 in England (excluding Greater London), 6 in Greater London, 3 in 
Scotland, 2 in Wales, 1 in Northern Ireland and 1 in Germany) We reported back to 
participants on each set of seminars as they were completed.8  The organiser of each 
seminar introduced us according to a prearranged schedule indicating where we were 
from and the seminar's title.  Participants were provided with hard copies of our 
PowerPoint slides and further details about the project. At the end of this introduction 
we requested agreement to record the proceedings so that they could be analysed later.  
Guarantees were given that no institution or individual would be identified in the 
resulting analysis and no-one objected to the recordings being made. 
 
9.  The sequence followed in the seminars was developed in the light of our 
experience – first on the basis of the two pilot seminars and then after each set of five 
seminars.  The sequence adopted in the later seminars is summarised in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 See http://www.ex.uk/codes of conduct/Workshop/Progress/index.htm 
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Table 1: The sequence followed in the later seminars 
 
1. Title slide ‘The Life Sciences, Biosecurity, and Dual-Use Research’  
 
2. The objective of the project: 
 
How might regulatory controls enhance biosecurity in the life sciences? 
How can policy makers and life scientists engage in dialogue? 
Could codes of conduct be a viable and effective approach? 
 
3. Mousepox experiment 
 
 Description of the experiment and results 
  
4.  Publication of the Mousepox results 
 
 Given that the result was unforeseen… 
Question: Should it have been published in the Journal of Virology? 
Question: Should it have been published in the semi-popular journal 
The New Scientist?   
 
5.  Given that similar results were published earlier 
 
 Question: What options are there for the publication of such research?  
 
6.  Should the mousepox experiment have been done? 
 
 If the danger had been recognised beforehand… 
 Question: Should the experiment have been done? 
 
7. Responding to future possibilities  
 
 IL-4 experiments moved from mousepox to rabbitpox and cowpox 
Question: Should we always seek to anticipate the future? 
 
8. National oversight committee (based on US Fink Committee proposals) 
 
Assuming such an oversight committee was introduced nationally 
around the world 
 Question: Would it helpful or be dangerous? 
 
9. Codes of Conduct 
 
 Awareness raising about British and international codes activities 
 Questions posed by the Chair of the 2005 BTWC meetings 
 
10.  References and contact information 
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The first slides, asking whether work should have been done, or should have been 
published, or maybe published in different ways always provoked such a discussion 
that we rarely got beyond showing 8 to 10 slides in the hour generally allocated for 
the seminar.   
 
10.  As already noted, the sequence followed was developed in the light of  our 
experience as we discovered which slides 'worked' – in the sense of initiating a 
fruitful discussion.  Consequently, in order to understand the basis for evaluations 
made about the biosecurity issues posed, we developed the seminar’s content so as to 
test out the assumptions and inferences underlying participants’ statements.   
 
Development of the approach 
 
11. In this section, we analyse some of our findings about the approach that we 
adopted in the seminars.  We found that claims about the inevitability of scientific 
development loomed large in many of the justifications we heard for downplaying or 
dismissing questions about whether certain experiments should not be conducted on 
biosecurity grounds, whether the scientific papers should be modified or even not 
published in light of such concerns, or whether viable systems of oversight  in regard 
to work of concern could be established. Participants felt that the question of whether 
some line of work should be done missed the point that it would be done (in the end) 
by someone; which in turn would also mean that everyone ‘skilled in the art’ would 
know about it.  In this sense then, limitations or controls would be futile. 
 
12.  The extent to which such responses were offered was somewhat unexpected for 
us.  Many of our initial slides and prepared questions were designed to seek the 
boundary where participants might start expressing biosecurity concerns.  
Consequently, we initially included a slide about the artificial synthesis of polio virus 
(which we expected few researchers would say should not have been done) and then 
followed it up by a slide indicating the substantial pace with which synthesising 
capabilities have moved ahead in the last few years to see if this gave any reasons for 
pause.  In addition, the current effort to recreate the 1918 Spanish Flu was used as an 
‘extreme case’ for asking if there were any limits to what should be done or 
communicated.  Yet, because science was so often presented as more or less 
inevitable, these sorts of considerations or cases were deemed inconsequential by the 
participants. 
 
13. As a result of such interactions in the first seminars, we ended up dropping the 
slides that asked whether the speed of innovation was a problem and whether the case 
of the Spanish Flu questioned anyone’s appraisal.  We then had developed the 
sequence in order to consider how to better understand and probe characterizations of 
inevitability.  A slide was introduced in subsequent seminars that outlined the recent 
significant expansion of biodefence programmes in the US.  We had hoped by 
bringing to the fore the contingent policy choices made about what gets funded in the 
life sciences (and thus what science gets done), this would lead some participants to 
openly query claims made by others about inevitability.  When this failed to happen 
we then introduced a slide summarising themes of earlier seminars, in which we 
explicitly challenged notions about inevitability by comparing the limited funds 
dedicated to many tropical diseases against those recently made available for likely 
biological weapon agents.  However, this form of confrontational questioning rarely 
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resulted in much discussion; in fact it tended to stop whatever dialogue had been 
fostered up to that point.   
 
14.  In response, we again varied the manner in which we questioned statements about 
inevitability by first being sure to carefully probe for the assumptions underlining 
such statements and second by then challenging those accounts whenever a 
consideration pertinent them was later brought up (e.g., in relation to the funding of 
research).  Embedding our queries in this way generated much more dialogue about 
whether science is indeed ‘inevitable’.   
 
15.  In a similar manner we also sought to question other presumptions.  Assessments 
of inevitability typically relied on the assumption that once research was conducted, it 
would then automatically become known by others with suitable expertise in the field 
– in other words, as we often heard, ‘the genie was out of the bottle’.  Probing for the 
reasons why the dissemination of research was unavoidable indicated a number of 
issues such as the pressures placed on academics to publish and the advent of Internet 
publishing which meant vast amounts of resources were easily available.  Yet, such 
statements existed in an uneasy relationship with another claim sometimes made that 
the publication of some contentious research posed little danger because of difficulty 
of replicating results from the limited information given in articles.  With our growing 
understanding of responses, when such contrasting assessments were offered within 
the space of one seminar, this provided an occasion for encouraging dialogue between 
participants; when only one of them was offered we could forward the other to further 
deliberation.    
 
Analysis  
 
16. As we gained more experience of the responses made we also developed 'probes' 
that would enable us to investigate the reasons for and implications of the views that 
participants were putting forward – this was done either by using new slides or by 
asking previously prepared questions.   It was not always easy to introduce our probes 
into a fast-flowing discussion so we adopted a tactic of trying to restate what we had 
heard, elaborating what we thought this meant, and what implications we saw, before 
investigating further what was intended by the speaker. 
 
17. The tape recordings of the seminars were transcribed and then analysed 
independently by each of the two investigators.  The analysis carried out in this 
Briefing Paper utilised data gathered during the two pilot seminars and 15 of the 
subsequent seminars and was done specifically in relation to the discussions 
scheduled this year in the BTWC MX/2005 and MSP/2005 meetings.  However, the 
results obtained in the later seminars were broadly consistent with those reported in 
this analysis.  
 
18.  From the point of view of the BTWC MX/2005 and MSP/2005 meetings, two 
sets of questions appeared of most relevance.  The first set related to the problem that 
is of interest to the community concerned with the strengthening of the regime totally 
prohibiting biological weapons: 
 
1. Did those engaged in the life sciences think that there was a major danger 
of bioterrorism and biological weapons? 
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and: 
 
2. If they considered that there was such a danger, did they consider that 
developments in the life sciences contributed to the problem? 
 
These questions were not asked directly but the answers could be deduced from what 
was said by participants in our seminars.  
 
19. The second set of questions were concerned with whether possible new control 
measures should or could be introduced: 
 
3. Did participants think that a preproject review related to biosecurity (not 
biosafety) – with the implication that some research could be reformulated, 
transferred, delayed or even halted – should or could be introduced at the 
local level? 
 
4. Did participants think that a further prepublication review related to 
biosecurity – with the implication that some publication could be modified or 
stopped – should or could be introduced? 
 
5.  Should a national system or could an effective national system, such as 
that suggested by the Fink Committee and presently being introduced in the 
United States, in which local reviews are directed, monitored and developed 
at a national level be introduced? 
 
and finally: 
 
6. Should an enhanced process or could an effective process of international 
review, as suggested in the UK's background paper on science and technology 
for the BTWC Fifth Review conference, be introduced to guide national 
systems of review? 
 
Again these questions were not asked directly at our seminars.  Questions (3-6)  could 
produce more complex answers than did Questions (1-2).  Questions 1 and 2 about 
whether there is a threat and whether developments in the life sciences contributes to 
any such threat are susceptible to "yes" or "no" answers. Questions 3-6 in the second 
set might provoke different responses if the proposed review (such as in question 3) 
was envisaged as providing advice (code of ethics), guidance (code of conduct) or 
regulatory (code of practice).  As we were not carrying out interviews with individual 
researchers, we were rarely able to reach that level of detail in our questioning. 
 
20. The fact that our data were collected from different people at different times and 
that no-one was directly asked the set of questions 1-6 means that we cannot report 
what a standard answer from one person might be to all of these questions.  In our 
results section we therefore take a different approach.  First we set out two "ideal 
types" of response that one might imagine would be found in the life sciences 
community.  The term “ideal type” does not imply a judgment on the desirability of 
the responses.  Rather it is an analytical term that refers to an abstracted, one-sided 
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model devised as a heuristic device to understand complex phenomenon.9 We then 
give brief indicative sample statements that we have in our transcripts that appear 
relevant to our questions.  This leads us finally to a prediction of what responses 
could be expected to predominate in this community at present.  In the final section of 
this Briefing Paper we set out the implications of our findings for MX/2005 and 
MSP/2005. 
 
Results 
 
21. The first "ideal" type we might imagine is that of a life scientist who is convinced 
that there is a major problem of bioterrorism/biological weapons, that developments 
in the life sciences could contribute to that problem, and that something should and 
could be done by the life sciences community to help deal with the problem.  We 
might call this the security-conscious type and imagine a set of general responses to 
our questions as in Table 2.  The specific arguments we heard can then be categorised 
in relation to these general responses. 
 
Table 2: Responses of a "Security Conscious" person 
 
1. There is a problem of bioterrorism and biological weapons. 
 
2. Developments in the life sciences could contribute to the problem in a 
variety of ways. 
 
3. An effective preproject review on biosecurity grounds should and could be 
introduced at a local level. 
 
4. Given the possibility of unexpected results, an effective prepublication 
review should and could be implemented. 
 
5. An effective national system of review should and could also be 
implemented. 
 
6. An effective international review system to help standardise national review 
systems should and could be introduced. 
 
22. A second "ideal" type that can be imagined is that from a life scientist who does 
not believe that there is a major threat, or that developments in the life sciences 
contributes in any way to whatever threat there is, and therefore that no extra controls 
are needed on security grounds – indeed that such extra controls would hinder the 
advance of beneficial science.  We might call this the classic open science type and 
imagine a set of responses to our questions as in Table 3.  Again the specific 
arguments put forward by seminar participants can then be grouped in relation to 
these more general categories. 
 
                                                 
9 The sociologist Max Weber coined the term ideal types and elaborated its utility for social analysis.  
He specified that ‘An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view 
and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent 
concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized 
viewpoints into a unified analytical construct.’ See http://www.answers.com/topic/max-weber 
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Table 3: Responses of a "Classic Open Science" person 
 
1. There is little evidence of a problem of bioterrorism and biological 
weapons. 
 
2. Neither is there evidence that developments in the life sciences could 
contribute to the problem. 
 
3. An effective preproject review on biosecurity grounds should and could not 
be introduced at a local level. 
 
4. An effective prepublication review should not be and could not be 
implemented. 
 
5. An effective national system of review should and could not be 
implemented. 
 
6. An effective international review system to help standardise national review 
systems should and could not be introduced. 
 
23.  It is also possible to conceive of a variety of intermediate or alterative "ideal" 
types, for example, a set of responses from a public relations-conscious researcher 
who does not think that there is a real threat but believes it would be useful to be seen 
to be doing something as long as it is not a burden and does not interfere with the 
progress of research.  We will note some such complexity in the responses we 
describe later. 
 
24. As would be expected by members of the community concerned with the 
strengthening of the regime totally prohibiting biological weapons, one of the slides 
concerned the Australian mousepox experiment.  We used slides referring to the 
mousepox experiment in all our seminars and increasingly, as our surprise at the 
responses grew, took to asking directly how many people in the group had any 
knowledge of the experiment or of the concern it had caused in the community 
concerned with the strengthening of the regime totally prohibiting biological 
weapons.  Our data indicate that to find more than 10 per cent of a life sciences 
audience who even heard of this experiment would be extremely unusual!  We 
take this and other interactions to indicate that few in this section of the worldwide 
life sciences community have much awareness of the BTWC let alone given any 
consideration to the issues being considered at MX/2005 and MSP/2005 in Geneva 
and elsewhere.  Thus it is unlikely that most people in our seminars could have given 
a completely coherent set of responses such as those in Tables 2 or 3 if we had been 
able to interview them individually in detail.  Nevertheless what is interesting is the 
balance of the kinds of arguments we heard and, given that we encountered several 
hundred people, the arguments we did not hear or heard very infrequently. 
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The First Set of Questions 
 
Question 1:  Is there a major bioterrorism/biological weapons threat? 
 
25. Though we never asked this question directly, it is remarkable how little attention 
was paid to it by our participants.  The state-level offensive programmes of the 
twentieth century were very rarely raised, and the BTWC itself almost never 
mentioned – and when it was, was rarely understood.  Bioterrorism, if discussed at all, 
was thought to be used as a political means of frightening people, a participant in an 
early seminar, for example, saying: "the problem is whenever you talk about 
bioterrorism these days people are terrified."  It was also seen as a means of avoiding 
the real problem: "If you could stop terrorism at source than you wouldn't need to 
spend all these billions [on biodefence], or if a few of those billions were spent on 
regeneration of those countries….we should be looking at that really as the very first 
issue." 
 
Question 2:  Do developments in the life sciences contribute to the problem? 
 
26. Amongst the community concerned with the strengthening of the regime totally 
prohibiting biological weapons it is not difficult to find extensive discussions of how 
developments in the life sciences could contribute to the problem of biological 
weapons and bioterrorism, for example through unexpected results of experiments, 
the spread of technology capabilities and the general increase in understanding of 
fundamental biological processes.10  Whilst an occasional participant expressed a 
concern that publications of the developments in the life sciences might provide a 
'roadmap' for terrorists, the overwhelming sentiments were that they did not 
contribute to the problem as bioterrorism was carried out elsewhere.  In discussing 
the synthesis of polio virus, a participant asked: "Is it really the high technology that 
is so potentially dangerous? I would have thought that you’ve got low relatively cheap 
technology that could be used [by the terrorist]."  A different argument was related to 
the degree of regulation: "Surely we should be more worried about research [other] 
than research carried out in responsible institutions such as universities.  It's regulated 
by peers…it's the stuff that's going on in countries that aren't regulated, don't publish 
[that should be of concern]." 
 
27. What was most noticeable was that nowhere did a participant set out an argument 
showing a clear understanding of how – by what mechanisms – developments in the 
life sciences could contribute to the threat.  Such an argument was not even put 
forward just to refute it.  This again suggested to us that the problem had not been 
seriously considered other than by very few participants.  That is not to say that 
participants were unconcerned about the social implications of their work.  As one 
argued: "I think it's a myth that I hope we've relegated to history – the idea of value-
free science.  We've had a British Society for Social Responsibility of Science for 
some thirty plus years."  This participant was clearly concerned about the 
responsibility of scientists, and concluded: "the problem is the ethics is running a long 
way behind the actual scientific advances." 
 
                                                 
10 See, for example, the articles in the special issue of Disarmament Forum, 1, 2005 on Science, 
Technology and the CBW Regimes. 
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The Second Set of Questions 
 
28. The possible answers to our questions 3, 4, 5 and 6 are potentially more complex 
than those to questions 1 and 2.  It would be possible, for example, to consider that a 
preproject review should be introduced but to consider that it could not be effectively 
implemented, or to believe that a prepublication review should not be introduced 
even if it was considered that it could be effectively implemented.  Although we 
encountered some examples of this type, for the most part the relevant responses we 
heard were more straightforward for us to analyse. As we asked about experiments, 
publications and national reviews in sequence we can also analyse the arguments that 
arose in relation to our questions separately. 
 
Question 3: Should and could there be a local preproject review? 
 
29. As noted previously, a few participants were concerned about civil research 
providing a roadmap for terrorists, but overwhelmingly, the arguments we heard 
related to concerns about the possibility of extra controls preventing work being done.  
There was the argument of inevitability – that at a certain stage of scientific 
development (in technology and ideas) the experiment would be done somewhere 
even if a local (or other) review prevented it in a particular institution.  In regard to 
the synthetic polio demonstration by Wimmer and his colleagues, a seminar 
participant stated: "Surely the whole issue is the fact that this technology's been 
around for a long time and if Wimmer hadn't done it someone else would have done 
it." 
 
30. A related argument in regard to the polio synthesis experiment was that, although 
it was known to be theoretically possible, until it was done one could not be sure.  So 
the experiment was necessary to demonstrate that it could indeed be done: "You 
might think yes, you could do that because you've got various techniques or machines 
to do it, but until you actually physically do it, you don't know that you can do it."  
Other participants argued that the polio experiment was also necessary not just to 
demonstrate that it could be done, but to raise awareness of the fact.  This is clear 
from the following exchange: 
 
Participant: "...so should it have been done?  Yes, it brought it, at long last, to the 
attention of people in government that these sorts of experiments are pretty easy..." 
 
Interviewer: "So if I understand correctly, this should have been done because it was 
necessary to bring this to the attention of government?" 
 
Participant: "Yes, people in power just didn't realise how easy it is to do some of 
these experiments in science these days."   
 
31.  It should be noted though that the participant in this case was adamant that this 
ease did not justify restrictions on research.  Closely related to this argument for 
raising awareness is the argument that the experiment also opens up the possibility of 
working on countermeasures to the newly discovered threat: "things that might 
happen in the future anyway, be prepared for it.  I think that's justification then for 
creating something, if you want to know what properties it will have so that you may 
be able to defend yourself against it."  
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32. Added to these arguments - inevitability, demonstration, awareness-raising and 
countermeasures - against any preproject review that could halt research was the view 
that such a review would be counterproductive as it would not stop those with 
malign intentions.  As one participant explained: "Isn't the problem as well with the 
regulation...that people who obey the regulations are not the people who are going to 
try and do, use science for these sorts of [malign] ends.  So you end up actually just 
hurting the people who are trying to use the science for positive reasons, by putting 
more obstacles in the way."  Again in relation to the argument that the technology 
used to synthesise polio opened up the possibility of a synthesis of something really 
dangerous like Ebola, a participant was horrified: "So are you saying we shouldn't 
make vaccines?  I mean look at the 'flu, for example, I mean that changes...Shouldn't 
we trace 'flu round using this sort of technology? So you're damning the technology 
just because it happens to be able to make Ebola potentially in about three or four 
years' time." 
 
33. Many of our participants appeared to see themselves as very small cogs in a large 
impersonal system over which they had little control.  Thus one participant in 
discussing the possibility of a review of the polio synthesis experiment stated: "I think 
in a lot of these things the genie's out of the bottle, you can't unlearn something, 
once somebody has put even a proposal...forward...it will be followed up.  It's in the 
wider scientific community, somebody will pick it up."  When the interviewers put 
the argument back to him for clarification, the participant replied: "If you're talking 
about taking the moral standpoint perhaps it's wrong to do this type of thing, but it's 
almost like trying to stop the sun rising tomorrow morning, once it's out, it's out."  
 
34.  The concerns expressed in regard to whether there should or could be a local 
preproject review are summarised in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Concerns expressed about a preproject review (Question 3) 
 
1. Inevitability of the experiment. 
 
2. Necessity to demonstrate that it works. 
 
3. Need to raise awareness. 
 
4. Utility to design countermeasures. 
 
5. Counterproductive (in hindering benign work). 
 
6. Damning the technology. 
 
7. Futility (as 'genie is out of the bottle'). 
 
Question 4: Should or could there be a prepublication review? 
 
35. After considering whether experiments should have been done we moved the 
participants on to a discussion of the publication of results.  Here we were able to ask 
more detailed questions on whether attempting to “publicise” (this term was often 
 15
used by participants to characterise any activity to communicate beyond the scientific 
community) as well as publish in scientific journals was a good idea, or whether some 
results were best not emphasised in terms of potential misuse (apart from informing 
relevant authorities). This approach generated a rich discussion.  Interestingly, it was 
exceedingly rare in any of our seminars for any reference to be made to the system 
already put in place in many top scientific journals - for a review to be carried out on 
biosecurity grounds.11
 
36. Again, while a few participants expressed some concerns about providing 
inadvertent help to terrorists in publications, there were many more arguments 
deployed against the idea of placing restrains on publications.  The first argument was 
similar to that of the inevitability of work being carried out.  Here the argument was 
that dissemination was inevitable once the work had been done.  One participant 
pointed out that people, and their expertise, move about: "Those people tend to work 
there for two or three years and then move...obviously publishing makes it open to the 
public, but in the scientific community if someone really wanted to know about this, 
whether it's published or not, I think there's access to...these sorts of experiment."  
When asked for clarification the participant confirmed his view: "I think once it's 
been done and methods are developed, it's not a secret if there are people doing it and 
these people will move to other places and take their expertise with them."  The 
presumption often stated by participants was that national governments were actively 
monitoring publications for their dual-use potential and undertaking the necessary 
follow up activities to devise effective countermeasures.  Another participant referred 
to the growing use of the Internet: "I suspect whether they had published or not it 
would have eventually got into the worldwide web somehow."  This participant had 
worked in defence and pointed out that, of course, this form of publishing would not 
occur in a "closed community laboratory."  Our seminars, however, were intended to 
be for and about academic work so there was certainly the possibility of Internet 
publication. 
 
37. Again, as in the discussions of whether the synthetic polio experiment should have 
been done, people argued that the mousepox experiment should have been published 
because it helped to increase awareness and opened up the possibility of developing 
countermeasures against poxviruses with cytokine-enhanced virulence.  A 
participant made this quite clear in stating: "One can use dangerous information to 
endanger others but one can also use dangerous information to protect people, and 
one could well argue that it's difficult to deal with unknown bioweapons and the more 
information the people who have to deal with them have, the better they'll be able to 
counter them."  Another supporting argument was that there could be other benefits 
in civil society from the publication of the mousepox result: "I think the information 
could be useful for people working in fields other than bioweapons such as gene 
therapy for example, engineering viruses for gene therapy." 
 
38. A further argument for publication concerned the social responsibility to publish 
after receiving funding: "I think there's a social issue here, and if you've got their 
funding and you've used their funds for this sort of research then you have a 
responsibility to report to them how you've used their money....the old adage was that 
it wasn't the responsibility of the scientist to govern what happened to the material, his 
                                                 
11 Journal Editors and Authors Group (2003) Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA,100,1464. 
 16
obligation, or her obligation was to publish their findings."  There was also the view 
that there was not a great deal of danger in publication anyway because it is so 
difficult to replicate the technical work described in a paper: "it actually can be 
practically quite difficult to do and what you inevitably do is actually contact the 
other lab to try and get on board technique or whatever, and so I would agree with the 
point that I don't think publishing is wrong necessarily."  Additionally, there was a 
concern that not publishing could, in some circumstances, lead to the accusation of 
there being a cover-up of important information.  Thus it was argued: "If they 
hadn't published it wouldn't the people, if they found out about this, accuse them...of 
there being a cover-up of some sort.  If they hadn't published it that might have back-
fired on them in that way." 
 
39. Accompanying such benign explanations there was very widespread recognition 
of the pressures scientists felt to publish in order to gain further funding.  Examples 
of this were numerous in our seminars, for example: "Nowadays if you don't publish 
you don't get any more money do you?" and "they may say they're doing it because 
they need to inform the wider public but a lot of it is public preening of 
feathers....there's a hell of a lot of money out there for defence-related research."  Two 
exchanges in different seminars illustrate the point that there is a felt need to 
publicise, not just publish, but also a strong distaste for that approach. 
 
 
 Seminar A 
 
Participant One: "It's part and parcel of the research sort of climate, if you want 
money you've got to get as much publicity as you possibly can." 
 
Participant Two: That's exactly what I was just going to say: there's money involved, 
suddenly you make a splash, suddenly your research group is set, money starts 
coming in to it..."  
 
Interviewer: "Yes… that was put to us in a previous seminar: it's not publish or perish, 
it's publicise or perish." 
 
General chorus of agreement 
 
 
Seminar B 
 
Participant One: "...it's when marketing get involved to twist things around that we 
end up with problems...and this need to have to hype up anything." 
 
Interviewer: "Why do we have to hype things?" 
 
Participant One: "Well it's just that..." 
 
Participant Two: "Core funding." 
 
Participant One: "Yes, current competitive environment..." 
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Interviewer: "So, if in the world in which you live funding is so crucial that if you 
have a finding that is interesting then you use it to the maximum in order that the 
funders know who you are?" 
 
Participant One: "Yes." 
 
Participant Three: "Yes, the funding bodies want you to do that anyway....They want 
you to hype it up so that they get advertising for whatever..." 
 
40. This argument for unrestricted publication on financial grounds is, of course, 
closely linked to career prospects.  Considering the mousepox publication, one 
participant stated: "It's just a balance between personal career, they know they 
probably shouldn't, they should sit on it.  But I imagine it comes down to: they've put 
a lot of work into this, so they probably would publish."  
 
41. We attempted to open up the discussion of publication of the mousepox 
experiment by relating a story we had been told that suggested that rather similar 
results had been published previously in the standard literature without any hype 
(Slide 5 in Table 1), but that the appropriate authorities had been informed (we had no 
way to check the veracity of the story, but there were articles in the pre-2001 open 
literature that illustrated the possibility).  There was some support for adopting a 
discreet approach: "I don't think they've restricted their knowledge though, they 
haven't restricted anything; they've published what they've done....they used that 
responsibility and told the appropriate authorities.  So in that way they kind of got the 
best of both worlds I think."  There was also the view that these issues were best not 
put into the mass media: "In a sense this is a better way to do it because the debate 
would be had by the people who need to have a debate...there is so much hysteria in 
the public about weapons of mass destruction."  Others were very sceptical of this 
approach at the present time, arguing that if there were bioweapons implications they 
would not be easy to hide: “Any editor worth his salt on the New Scientist, or other 
journals that are more populous would be scanning the literature so you don't need to 
spell it out yourselves, do you? You're going to get some good editor looking at that 
and realising and then putting the big headlines anyway, don't you think?"  It should 
be noted that such statements were offered despite our having suggested a case where 
a team did, in fact, bury the findings of research without editors putting its implication 
into ‘big headlines’. 
 
42. It should really be of little surprise that this community brought forward many 
arguments against blocking publications.  As one put it: "It's always been the culture 
as well in science to share information through peer review journals, let people know 
what you're working on, look what my group or I've discovered."   He went on to 
refer to a study of the Muslim world and the dangers of censorship on religious 
grounds, "there's a lot of scientists saying 'We're still in the dark ages because our 
religion limits us to the dark ages'." It should be noted though that this participant and 
others retreated from sweeping statements about the openness of (Western) science 
when challenged through reference to academic and commercial competitive factors 
that impede such openness.  Additionally, there was the question of how judgements 
about restrictions could be made on objective grounds acceptable to scientists even 
if such censorship was thought necessary.  As one participant argued, scientists had to 
stay away from making judgements about social consequences: "I think you have to 
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take that stand because otherwise you, it is very, it would be very difficult to 
determine how you would then make the decision." 
 
43.  The concerns expressed in regard to whether there should or could be a 
prepublication review are summarised in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Concerns about a prepublication review (Question 4) 
 
1. Disclosure is inevitable by some other means. 
 
2. Need to raise awareness. 
 
3. Utility to design countermeasures. 
 
4. Potential benefits (for civil research). 
 
5. Social responsibility to publish. 
 
6. Little danger because of the difficulty of replication. 
 
7. Pressure to publish for career and future funding reasons. 
 
8. Dangers of censorship to the scientific enterprise. 
 
9. Difficulty of making objective judgements about social consequences. 
 
10. Danger of backfire (if suspected of a cover-up). 
 
 
Question 5: Should or could there be national review systems like those proposed by 
Fink in the USA?  
 
44. As in much of Europe following the war in Iraq, there was a good deal of 
suspicion of the motives and goals of US government security-related initiatives.  We 
sought to avoid such responses by describing the system that the Fink Committee had 
suggested – and which is being implemented – but then asking whether such a system 
would be useful if it was implemented globally by many countries.  Our aim was to 
focus the discussion on the potential utility of the system. 
 
45. Some participants were willing to consider the possible merits of a national 
review system.  As two participants in an early seminar in our series expressed it in 
the following exchange: 
 
Participant One: "...you're doing it for the greater good of mankind...there needs to be 
some potential benefit..." 
 
Participant Two: “Got to be a valid and acceptable reason for doing it." 
 
Participant One: " So therefore, is it not reasonable then to have some overview of 
what the purposes of these activities are?" 
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However, there was again a range of counter-arguments voiced much more often. 
 
46. It was argued by a number of participants that such an overview system could stop 
work that needed to be done: "the counter-argument...is that if you know about how 
these things operate, and if there is a risk that people will become infected, isn't it 
important to know about it and to try and work out how you can subvert that and help 
people?"  Clearly the participant was arguing that it was precisely the experiments of 
concern, such as those designated by the Fink Committee in the USA, that needed to 
be carried out. 
 
47. Others argued that it simply would not be possible to get sufficient agreement 
about what was dangerous to get an enforceable system as the following exchange 
illustrates: 
 
Participant: "...I don't see really how it's enforceable....you will get people who will 
say 'This actually doesn't concern me, it's of no concern because we're not doing this 
type of work’ and anybody else can look at it and say blatantly they are ..." 
 
Interviewer: "So you're saying that you don't think it's technically possible?" 
 
Participant: " I don't think it's feasible..." 
 
This argument of infeasibility can also be seen in the following exchange at a 
different seminar: 
 
Participant: "...a lot of the potential applications probably aren't very obvious at the 
early planning stage, so it's going to be very difficult to get the local committee, 
biosecurity committee, to do that and come up with sensible recommendations." 
 
Interviewer: "So even if it's a good idea – practically your suspicion is that it would be 
extremely difficult to do..." 
 
Participant: "I think it's probably impossible to implement it when you can't get 
agreement among scientists about what should be regulated..." 
 
48. There was also a great concern that the implementation of such a national 
overview system would inhibit research by causing people to avoid areas of research 
where a great deal of extra irrelevant controls required more work.  Two such 
statements were: "It's that people think it's going to take too much time, it's going to 
take a lot of resources to get through the committee" and: "It's going to stop 
science...in the States people are already finding this an absolute nightmare.  I mean 
the biosafety rules that were brought in after 9/11 are just crazy..." 
 
49. There was undoubtedly also a view that the controls would be subject to evasion.  
The evasion could be within the country as one speaker pointed out: "Well, I mean, 
the problem with this sort of approach is that the only people who are likely to submit 
their proposals for evaluation by this committee are the very sorts of people we don't 
need to worry about in the first place....you can do it in the shed in the back garden if 
you wanted to, so...this sort of arrangement is just not going to pick up the people you 
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need to worry about."  Evasion was also seen to be possible internationally: "And also 
what will happen is the scientific community will decamp and go elsewhere.  You 
won't stop it." 
 
50. Concerns were also expressed about the potential for misuse of the system.  One 
speaker gave as an example: "If it's perceived that you make your application and the 
processes then aren't transparent and the answer comes back 'No, you can't do it' what 
people will think is that some national laboratory thought 'That's a very good idea, 
we'll do it...and we won't tell anybody we've done it'..." 
 
51. There was also the view that, whatever its faults, a national overview system 
might be good for public relations purposes.  This could be on behalf of scientists 
and/or government: "It's not really to regulate what's done.  It's more about public 
relations – that the government wants to convince people that there's a problem to 
solve for them by setting up these advisory boards.  So from the scientists' perspective 
you don't want to lose the public's confidence in science because that's being eroded 
enough anyway.  So if this advisory board served the purpose of, you know, making 
the government look good and also making the public confident in the science, it's not 
such a bad thing."  As we have already seen in regard to other questions we also heard 
in regard to a national system that there were easier routes for bioterrorists to cause 
harm than using advanced biotechnology and that the life sciences were already 
overregulated. 
 
52.  The concerns expressed in regard to whether there should or could be a national 
review system are summarised in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6: Concerns about a national review system (Question 5) 
 
1. We need to know. 
 
2. System not feasible because objective judgements cannot be made. 
 
3. System will inhibit benign research. 
 
4. System would be open to evasion nationally and internationally. 
 
5. System would be open to abuse. 
 
6. Might be useful as a public relations exercise. 
 
7. Easier routes for terrorists than using advanced biotechnology. 
 
8. Life sciences already overregulated in the UK. 
 
 
Question 6: Should or could there be an international review system? 
 
53.   As it was recognised that national review systems in individual countries should 
ideally be harmonised internationally, we considered whether the proposal, made by 
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the UK in its contribution to the background science and technology paper for the 
Fifth Review Conference, that there should be more frequent reviews of the advances 
in science and technology relevant to the BTWC than at the five year Review 
Conferences might be utilized to harmonise standards in national review systems. 
 
54.  For example, we thought that discussions, for example of the mousepox 
experiment, were perhaps missing the point if carried out in isolation.  Maybe the real 
issue is whether the direction of a research programme as a whole should be 
examined?  Thus the fact that mousepox with IL-4 inserted could lead to similar 
experiments with rabbitpox, cowpox (able to jump species), monkeypox and then 
smallpox was the concern that should be recognised.  This we considered would be 
the kind of issue that would be identified by experts of the BTWC States Parties if 
they were to have more regular reviews of relevant science and technology in the 
future. 
 
55. As there was so little knowledge of the BTWC amongst the participants in our 
seminars, we did not have time to raise this issue directly.  We did try to open up 
some discussion by outlining the vast increases in funding give to the National 
Institutes of Health for defensive work on dangerous pathogens in the United States.12  
We asked whether this approach, with the implication that as many possible threats as 
could be investigated would be investigated, seemed sensible.   
 
56. There was concern that this level of funding for biodefence could starve other, 
more important, fields of funds.  One participant summarised: “I think that that 
funding is so disproportionate in the States.  It's just taking away from the real issues."  
To that disproportionality argument was often added the view that you could not 
cover all the possibilities anyway.  For example, one speaker asked: "Can you 
imagine how many potential threats there are or what those potential threats are?...I 
don't think you're necessarily going to hit the nail on the head."  There were also 
participants who wondered whether working on the most dangerous 
agents/possibilities was a good idea.  One said: "I think it's a terrible model....We've 
just been talking about how we want to avoid experiments that lead in the direction of 
creating weapons and what they're doing there is putting $4.2 billion dollars into 
experiments that lead towards weapons and it's all being publicised presumably." 
 
57. Given that this discussion was rather more distant from Question 6, it would not 
be sensible to draw too strong a conclusion from the arguments presented.  However, 
when combined with the probability that the issues raised in our seminars were new to 
many in the audience, it does suggest that these scientists who, after all, view what 
they are doing as for the benefit of humankind, would respond carefully if they came 
to see greater dangers arising from their activities.13
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Malcolm R. Dando, The United States NIAID Research Programme on Biodefence: A Summary and 
Review of Varying Assessments. Bradford Science and Technology Reports No. 1, 2004. Available at:  
http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
13 Caitriona McLeish & Paul Nightingale, Effective Action to Strengthen the BTWC Regime:  The 
Impact of Dual Use Controls on UK Science, University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, 
Briefing Paper No. 17, May 2005.  Available at: http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc 
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Further Analysis 
 
58. It is possible to gain an insight into how important each of the concerns expressed 
were amongst the people we spoke to from the frequency with which versions of the 
same argument were put forward by different people in the seminars.  Table 7 shows 
arguments that we heard more than ten times in the 15 seminars and Table 8 shows 
arguments that we heard between five and ten times.  Clearly, therefore, in the 
discussions related to a preproject review the dominant argument was that at a 
particular point a certain experiment was inevitably going to be done somewhere by 
somebody.  Stopping the experiment in one place, on this reasoning, was (in the end) 
futile. 
 
Table 7: Concerns stated over ten times 
 
Against a preproject review 
 
Inevitability of the experiment. 
 
Against a prepublication review 
 
Disclosure inevitable by some other means. 
 
Pressure to publish. 
 
Against a national review system 
 
Not feasible because objective judgements cannot be made. 
 
 System will inhibit benign research. 
 
 System will be open to evasion nationally and internationally. 
 
 Life sciences already overregulated in the UK. 
 
59. In regard to the discussions related to a prepublication review there were two 
dominant concerns (Table 7).  First, it was considered that the information would 
inevitably be disclosed in some way even if publication were prevented.  It was also 
argued that there was enormous pressure to publish for career advancement and in 
order to obtain further funding.  Four arguments were most frequently heard in the 
discussions of a national review system: that it would be very difficult to make 
objective judgements; that it would inhibit good research; that the system would be 
subject to evasion; and that the life sciences were already overregulated in the UK. 
 
60. At a lower frequency we heard a further concerns against the proposed reviews 
(Table 8). 
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Table 8: Arguments stated between five and ten times 
 
Against a preproject review 
  
 Necessity to demonstrate that it works. 
  
 Need to raise awareness. 
 
 Utility to design countermeasures. 
 
Against a prepublication review 
 
 Need to raise awareness. 
 
 Utility to design countermeasures. 
 
 Social responsibility to publish. 
 
 Little danger because of difficulty of replication. 
 
 Dangers of censorship to the scientific enterprise. 
 
Against a national review system 
 
 System would be open to abuse. 
  
61.  It was argued that it was not sufficient to say something could theoretically be 
done, it had to be done to be sure.  It was also argued that doing an experiment like 
mousepox helped to raise awareness of possible biothreats and allowed 
countermeasures to be developed.  Raising awareness and designing 
countermeasures were also arguments that we heard often in our discussions of a 
prepublication review.  Additionally participants were concerned about the dangers 
of censorship to the scientific enterprise, felt that they had a social responsibility to 
publish, and that advanced biotechnology experiments would be difficult to 
replicate. Finally, in regard to a national review system, it was also argued that such a 
system could be subject to a variety of abuses.  
 
Conclusions 
 
62. As already mentioned, we thought it unlikely that many of the participants would 
have a coherent set of understanding as set out in our ideal types of "security 
conscious" (Table 2) and "classic" (Table 3).  Given that our data strongly suggest 
that few of our participants had given much consideration at all to the biosecurity 
issues discussed, it is even less likely that such coherence would characterize their 
thinking.  
 
63. The question of interest then is whether it would be reasonable to suggest that we 
were hearing from a community in which the arguments summarised in Tables 2 and 
3 were equally expressed and so indicating a mixture of evaluations for and against 
consideration of controls, or whether the arguments for such controls (Table 2) or 
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against such controls (Table 3) predominated in our discussions.  From the data 
summarised in Tables 4 - 8 it seems unreasonable to conclude anything other 
than that the responses set out in Table 3 - the "classic" ideal type - 
predominate.  Certainly, it would be a great surprise to us to do a seminar in the UK 
(or we suspect elsewhere) where we found anything other than what we have reported 
here.  Indeed, we would immediately have to investigate any special factors - perhaps 
an unusual educational module - that might explain the findings! 
 
64. There was little evidence from our seminars that participants: 
 
a. regarded bioterrorism or bioweapons as a substantial threat; 
 
b. considered that developments in the life sciences research contributed to 
biothreats; 
 
c. were aware of the current debates and concerns about dual-use research; or 
 
d. were familiar with the BTWC. 
 
This was a surprise to us, but it is consequently not surprising that the predominance 
of views expressed were those of the “classic” ideal type.  This situation does though 
tell us much about the existing levels of awareness of biosecurity issues within the 
academic life science community in the UK and indicates the importance of 
considering questions about the education of life scientists as an essential prerequisite 
to any development of codes.   
 
65. At successive Review Conferences of the BTWC States have agreed on the need 
to inform their scientific communities of the importance of the prohibitions embodied 
in the Convention.  As stated in the Final Declaration of the Fourth Review 
Conference of 1996 in regard to Article IV:14
 
The conference notes the importance of.... 
 
Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, scientific and military education 
programmes of information dealing with the prohibitions and provisions 
contained in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Geneva 
Protocol of 1925. 
 
Given the lack of awareness of the BTWC and related issues that we encountered in 
our seminars we can only conclude that whatever measures were taken in this regard 
in the UK were not very effective.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that this lack of 
awareness of the BTWC is not confined to the United Kingdom and the one seminar 
we conducted in another European country (Germany) produced results not 
significantly different from those in the UK.  It seems likely that a similar situation 
may occur in regard to life scientists generally. 
 
                                                 
14 Fourth Review Conference of the parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction (1996) Final Declaration. BWC/CONF.IV/9, Geneva.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
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66. One clear implication of our findings, therefore, is that if the States Parties to the 
BTWC wish to engage practising life scientists in their considerations of what might 
need to be done, and what could be done, about codes of conduct, a significant 
awareness-raising exercise is urgently required.  Such an exercise is needed over the 
longer term in order to benefit from their creative input in the national development 
and implementation of codes.  Clearly, for the section of the life sciences community 
in universities there is every reason to consider whether the longer-term awareness-
raising strategy should involve the development of educational provisions dealing 
with the problems of dual-use science and technology within the standard curriculum 
for life scientists.  UNESCO’s efforts through the World Commission on the Ethics of 
Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST)15 could contribute to such efforts.  
 
67.  Our findings underline the points made by the Royal Society in its policy 
document 04/0516 addressing the issues to be considered by the States Parties to the 
BTWC in 2005 which noted that: 
 
Introducing extended codes of conduct or practice based on existing health 
and safety regulations provides an opportunity for education and training to 
reinforce these regulations. Such a code would need to be consulted before 
any new work was conducted and at key stages during the project, and have 
greater value than a code that is a reference document. This would also 
reinforce the responsibility of scientists to take into consideration the 
reasonably foreseeable consequences of their activities.   
 
and went on to add that: 
 
Undergraduate and postgraduate education programmes should ensure that 
students are capable of considering the reasonably foreseeable consequences 
of their activities, including identifying the possible misuse of science as well 
as tangible benefits to humanity. These programmes should recognise the 
potential for later misuse by the trained person of basic skills, technologies or 
knowledge acquired during the training. Examples of previous misuse of such 
training could be used where appropriate for the students concerned.  When 
students enter postgraduate training within a research laboratory they are 
required to read, understand and comply with local and national safety 
legislation. Codes of conduct or practice provide an opportunity for education 
and training to reinforce the ethical and practical aspects of preventing the 
misuse of science. 
 
68. States Parties are devoting the 2005 sessions to codes of conduct for the life 
sciences because there is a real concern about the threat, that developments in the life 
sciences contribute to that threat, and therefore that additional measures – in the form 
of codes – should be carefully examined.  Whilst it might be possible to elaborate and 
implement such codes without the direct engagement of practising life scientists, but 
                                                 
15 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, What is the COMEST?  Available 
at:http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php_URL_ID=1856&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=2
01.html 
16 The Royal Society, Issues for discussion at the 2005 Meeting of Experts of the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention, RS policy document, June 2005. Available at: http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/ 
document.asp?id=1170 
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given that they work at this particular coalface, such development and implementation 
will surely be more effective if done with their engagement.  Our belief is that whilst 
some of their concerns will diminish as they further analyse these issues as a 
community, some core problems will remain.  The diplomatic/security community 
needs, in our opinion, to imaginatively address these issues if an effective system is to 
be achieved. 
 
69. If we consider the arguments we heard most frequently (Table 7) it is relatively 
easy to dismiss some, such as the inevitability of science.  Similarly, there is no need 
for certain areas of research to be inhibited by new controls as long as care is taken to 
avoid such an outcome and disclosure of results can be guarded against if that is 
necessary.  On the other hand, some of our participants’ concerns are difficult to 
dismiss.  In the UK academic environment there is a huge pressure on scientists to 
publish their results.  To be prevented from doing so could be damaging to a scientists 
career prospects.  Our participants did feel overregulated, they could envisage ways in 
which a national review system could be evaded and they would need a great deal of 
convincing that objective judgements could be made about the social consequences of 
the work they wished to publish. 
 
70. In the "Controlling Dangerous Pathogens" project at the University of Maryland17 
the last of these issues is dealt with by splitting the analysis.  First, on the basis of a 
detailed questionnaire, the proposed project is put into one of three categories: 
potentially, moderately or extremely dangerous.  Potentially dangerous research 
would be the overwhelmingly large category and would be dealt with at the local 
level.  The other two categories would require national and international scrutiny.  
Only after this scientific analysis would a social cost benefit assessment be made, and 
it would be assumed that most work would be agreed as permissible as the risks 
would be low.  The success of such a system as a means of constraining in some form 
ill-advised experiments would crucially hinge on the feasibility of credibly conducting 
a social cost-benefit analysis for research categorized as moderately or extremely 
dangerous. 
 
71. Given the widespread use of peer review in countries like the UK and its long 
experience of regulation through the Health and Safety Executive, it would seem that 
there are good grounds for believing that an adequately transparent system could be 
institutionalized at a national level if it is thought to be required and feasible.   
 
72. In summary then, our conclusion, based on the work we have carried out in 
academia in the UK, is that it is likely that large sections of the worldwide life 
sciences community have hardly begun to address the question of their 
responsibilities in regard to the dual-use potential of the results and techniques of their 
work.  We consider that a major effort will be required on the part of States Parties if 
the level of awareness of these scientists is to be increased. But we also believe that 
the life sciences community have much to contribute - much that perhaps only they 
can contribute - to the definition and necessary solution to the dual use problem.  A 
further and sustained engagement is required – a goal to which a a ‘code of conduct’ 
could contribute. 
                                                 
17 Steinbrunner, J.D. and Harris, E.D. (2003) Controlling Dangerous Pathogens. Issues in Science and 
Technology, Spring. Available at: www.nap.edu/issues/19.3/steinbrunner 
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